

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*

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## What U.S. Must Do to Implement Current Policy

The immediate object of our foreign policy is national security; the long-range object is world peace. Upon these elementary things men of all parties can agree. Disagreement arises over the question of how the first object is to be achieved. In a broad way there are, here, three schools of thought. The first, represented best by former President Herbert Hoover and ex-Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, may be called Gibraltarism; it argues that the best way to achieve national security is to retire behind our own walls and be prepared to repel all attacks. The second may be called globalism; it argues that the United States should contain and repel the Communist threat everywhere on the globe. This, of course, hands over the initiative to the Communists and involves a dissipation of resources that inevitably spells defeat. The third, which is pretty much the current policy, looks first to the strengthening of the Atlantic community as the most effective way of containing the Soviet Union and as giving the United States time in which to rearm for any ultimate offensive that may be required.

### Implications of U.S. Policy

We have not yet fully accepted the logical implications of the third policy. Here are some of those implications:

1. We must not dissipate our strength in a fruitless effort to conquer Communist China now. We should not commit further ground forces to Korea because we may need them elsewhere. At the same time we should not concede our case in Korea. The argument for defending Korea is a sound one and remains sound;

it is analogous to the British decision to defend Greece in 1941—a defense made on moral, rather than primarily on military, grounds.

2. We must not involve ourselves in policies which may permanently alienate

As its contribution to the "great debate," the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The first article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

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China. To do so may lose us the support of India as well as of China, and this may plunge the whole of Asia not only into communism but into an anti-American and pro-Soviet policy. We should try to detach the Chinese Communists from the Soviet orbit of influence as Tito has been detached from Soviet influence in Europe. Needless to say, this does not require "appeasement" of the Chinese Communists.

3. We must at all costs strengthen Western Europe against the danger of Russian attack or Communist uprisings at home. We cannot do this by requiring that Western Europe rearm before we

send men and supplies. Our own contribution must come first; otherwise it is not to be supposed that Russia will permit a general rearmament of Europe. We cannot, for example, expect Western Germany to build an army in the face of the Soviet statement that it will not tolerate such rearmament, unless we are there in force to protect Germany against attack. Our obligation here under the Atlantic pact is clear; so, too, is our moral obligation.

4. Our obligation toward Western Europe is by no means merely a military one. It is economic, and it is moral. The economic obligation has been in part fulfilled through the Marshall plan, but a good deal remains to be done if Western European states are to be restored to a position where their economies can stand the burden of rearmament. The moral obligation is a more complex one and no less important. It would take us too far afield to analyze it, but this much can be said: It requires us to do our utmost to avoid anything that might make European states the victims of Soviet aggression; it requires us to follow a collective, not a unilateral, course on such matters as Far Eastern policy, the use of the atomic bomb, and so forth.

5. Not only can we not expect Western Europeans to fall in with our plans if adopted unilaterally; we cannot expect them to expose themselves to the danger of war or revolution on behalf of the American notions of free enterprise. We must somehow meet their very real and wholly understandable fears about our economic program, and we must learn to cooperate with the Third Forces, or the socialist or

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semi-socialist governments of Britain and the continent. If we present Europe with a choice between communism and a Chamber of Commerce version of free enterprise, it may very well say, "A plague on both your houses," and stand aside. We have to make clear that security, liberty and democracy do not bear a "Made in America" label and that they can be achieved without sacrifice of those social and economic experiments upon which socialist governments on the continent are embarked.

6. All this requires a far more sensitive sense of responsibility at home than we have heretofore revealed. One price we will have to pay for European cooperation is that of sobriety and restraint at home. We cannot indulge ourselves in

the luxury of McCarthyism, or in flagrant affronts like the McCarran Bill, or in irresponsible attacks on British socialized medicine or on Britain and France for failing to rearm as fast as we should like them to rearm. We cannot indulge ourselves in arrogant superiority toward European peoples, who know as much about communism as we do and who have sacrificed much in fighting totalitarianism.

7. Above all we must make clear that we do not exclude the possibility of a peaceful settlement of differences with the Communist nations, either in Asia or in Europe. If our program is one that assumes the inevitability of war with Russia and its satellites, it will not win the sincere support of Western Europe. We must keep our own record clear, on moral

grounds. We must continue to keep open the door to negotiation on practical grounds. We must realize that whatever the outcome of a war with the U.S.S.R. may be for us, for Western Europe it will spell destruction. Europeans know this; we know it in theory but have not taken to ourselves a real sense of its meaning. Europe is too fresh from the last war to contemplate with anything but horror a repetition of that experience. We must therefore make clear our conviction that rearmament and economic strength are the best guarantees of peace and that it is to secure peace that we advocate them.

HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

(Professor Commager, of Columbia University, is the author of many books, the most recent of which is *The American Mind*, published by the Yale University Press in 1950.)

## ***Will UN Members Follow U.S. on China Policy?***

WASHINGTON—Despite the emphasis which President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson have laid on the attainment of "strength" as the major present purpose of United States foreign policy, they themselves appear uncertain about exactly what constitutes strength. As a result United States foreign policy continues to lack clear form and direction.

### ***Resolution on China***

In espousing "strength" the President and his Secretary of State have repeatedly cited the North Atlantic treaty and the United Nations as the instruments through which this goal is to be reached. They have asserted that the United States cannot stand alone and that Europe is the focus of American interest. However, in recommending to the United Nations on January 20 that the organization brand the Chinese Communist government an aggressor for its intervention in the Korean war, the Truman Administration has again shifted the focus of American interest to Asia and has taken the risk that the United States might be left to stand alone by fellow members of the UN who are reluctant to be diverted from developing strength in Europe to new difficulties in a distant theater of operations.

This reluctance was dramatically emphasized on January 22, when Sir Benegal N. Rau, Indian delegate to the UN, disclosed that Peiping had privately informed India a cease-fire in Korea could be arranged as a first step at a seven-power conference before settlement of general political problems. While British delegate Sir Gladwyn Jebb told the Political and

Security Committee of the UN that Peiping's reported statement created a "new situation," American delegate Warren R. Austin denounced it as "a transparent effort to divide the free world."

We need a new definition of "strength." Does it mean concentrating on the defense of Europe? Does it require stepped-up activity in Asia? Can we be stronger if we follow unilaterally our own sovereign bent or if we modify our national inclinations so as to harmonize with the combined opinion of our allies? American sponsorship of the resolution on China, in other words, has introduced a new element into the "great debate." Besides considering whether the United States ought to become self-reliant within narrow strategic boundaries, we must now consider whether we should become self-reliant while extending the boundaries of the area of our strategic interest.

In view of the casualties suffered by American forces since Communist China intervened in Korea in October, the Truman Administration's desire to have China held responsible is wholly understandable. This natural desire, however, could lead not to an increase in our strength but to a revelation of our lack of concrete strength at this date, even if the major UN powers outside the Soviet sphere stand by us. If passage of our resolution is to be followed by economic sanctions, such sanctions would have to be applied to the U.S.S.R. as well as to China in order to succeed. Much of China's trade comes from within the Soviet sphere. No disposition, however, exists abroad or within the Administra-

tion here to apply sanctions to the U.S.S.R. Thus economic sanctions, which our principal allies in Europe and Asia oppose, promise to have little effect on the Korean war.

The making of a meaningless gesture about economic sanctions can only harm the prestige of the United Nations and the United States and tempt the Administration to bolster such sanctions with more far-reaching action. Some supporters of the United States believe the resolution would be a milepost along the road to real war between the United States and China and possibly to conflict with the Soviet Union. An Australian newspaper, the *Melbourne Herald*, for example, commented on January 18 that "America is being swung toward the inevitability of accepting a war of exhaustion in Asia" or at best "is being maneuvered into accepting dangerously heavy commitments in East Asia." The commitments are dangerous because we lack the force and material to fight a war with China. American military involvement in China could be more advantageous to the Soviet Union than to the United States. Nor can we be sure how many Asians are ready to support us wholeheartedly come what may. The crossing of the 38th Parallel last September without any previous attempt by the United States or the United Nations to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict before the entrance of the Chinese, causes Asians to doubt our present contention that China showed itself to be an enemy of peace by its refusal, published on January 17, to accept the proposals for a cease-fire in Korea.

## Uncertainty About Course

The Administration, in the midst of its search for a position of strength, is weakened by lack of a program for future action in Asia. Within the State Department, as well as between the State Department and the Defense Department, disagreement exists on such basic issues as whether the United States should recommend a withdrawal from Korea. There are also differences as to whether the United States could carry out a military engagement with China even if it occurred at some spot more favorable to us than Korea. The military attitude is that foreign policy commitments should not outreach our military ability to make them good; Secretary Acheson has consistently taken the view that we must make the policy stand we regard as desirable and then find the means to support it. American military officials in general opposed action in Korea last June; Mr. Acheson recommended it. The prevailing policy now toward Korea is to maintain a UN

position there, but the military have been disappointed by the course of the Korean war and have not yet succeeded in stabilizing the fighting front. Nor is there unanimity in Washington about the advisability of encouraging Chiang Kai-shek to attack the mainland.

The doubts of his colleagues within the Administration and military difficulties in Korea do not deter Secretary Acheson from his course, which has the backing of Congress. The House of Representatives on January 20 overwhelmingly supported, on a voice vote, a resolution introduced by Representatives John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, the Democratic leader, and Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts, the Republican leader, stating that "the United Nations should . . . declare the Chinese communist authorities an aggressor in Korea." The sentiment of the Senate, although not yet recorded, is similar. In view of the attitude of Congress and of his own conclusions, Secretary Acheson did not wait

for the United Nations to pass judgment on the Chinese reply of January 17 to the UN cease-fire resolution but independently dismissed it that same day as "unacceptable."

Our principal allies, Britain and France, do not share the official American opinion about China, but American diplomatic representatives abroad have implied in informal conversations with representatives of other governments that the future of the United Nations is at stake in the China issue. No Administration or congressional spokesman has pointed out to the American people that the United States, which itself recognized in 1945 the limitations of the UN by insisting on retention of the veto, has been expecting too much from the international organization. Nor have they faced the possibility that this country may contribute to the break-up of the UN by insisting that UN members should always support American policy without qualification.

BLAIR BOLLES

## Would Peace Treaty Ease Crisis Over German Arms?

In its notes of January 20 to Britain and France, the Soviet Union repeated its charge that the remilitarization of Germany would threaten the peace of Europe and called again for a Big Four meeting. These notes underlined fears expressed in Western Europe, especially in France, that plans to use German units in a European army may provoke an armed attack by the U.S.S.R. before adequate North Atlantic defenses have been built up. It also called attention, indirectly, to the apprehension—reported to the *New York Times* from Frankfurt by Drew Middleton on January 18—that the Kremlin may use the Russians' vivid recollection of past German aggressions to arouse popular support for a "preventive war."

### A German Treaty?

The American proposal to rearm the Germans has meanwhile aroused serious opposition within Germany itself. Moreover, it could lead to a strengthening of neo-Nazism, and it may undermine French morale.\* As a result, alternative policies—and especially new negotiations with the Russians—have come up for renewed consideration. Reports that Moscow is preparing for the imminent outbreak of war in Europe have increased the pressure for a time-gaining compromise.

\*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Jan. 5 and 12, 1951.

If negotiations should take place, what would be the basis of discussion? The Russian note of November 3 to the United States, Britain and France—based on the Prague eight-country statement of October 21, 1950—called for four points: 1) no remilitarization of Germany and the "formation of a united, peace-loving democratic German state"; 2) German economic development with no war potential; 3) a peace treaty with Germany and the withdrawal of occupation troops a year thereafter; and 4) a German constituent council "on a parity basis, consisting of representatives of Eastern and Western Germany."

The United States, in its reply of December 22, declared that the Prague proposals contained no new features, that the solution proposed had been rejected by the majority of Germans, and that these old ideas had "proved after exhaustive examination to afford no basis for a constructive solution of the German problem." The Western powers, in notes on May 25 and October 9, 1950, had suggested that German unity be restored by means of free elections held under international supervision, but these notes had never been answered.

Some of the technical problems to be solved in any big-power meeting appear almost insuperable. The Prague proposals, for example, imply that the constituent

council would contain as many East as West German representatives. But since the Eastern zone has a population of only 18 million as compared to more than 45 million in the West, the United States would doubtless insist on representation proportional to the number of inhabitants. It would also demand that all parties be permitted to campaign and nominate candidates in the Eastern as well as the Western zone, but difficulties would certainly arise in assuring fair elections. Impasses have been reached in the past over controls on German remilitarization and production restrictions and over reparations.

Are the Russians now prepared—at a moment when they appear to have the upper hand—to make some concessions which, on balance, we might prefer to the probable consequences of rearming the West Germans? Those who say Yes point to reports that the East Germans make poor disciples of communism and that the arming of about 100,000 People's Police has disturbed East Europeans, shaking their confidence in Russian intentions. To put these apprehensions to rest, it is said, the June 7, 1950 treaty between Poland and East Germany, which confirmed German acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary, reassured the Poles that they could keep their newly acquired former German territories. This agreement, however, did not inspire pro-Russian sentiment among



the Germans. The conclusion is therefore drawn that Moscow might sacrifice control of East Germany in exchange for a treaty which promised to keep the Bonn Republic disarmed and outside a Western alliance.

Moreover, if Germany were unified and demilitarized, the Communists might still seize power from within by political means, as the difficulties of the restored state would provide ample scope for their operations. Such a situation would also offer an opportunity for a deal with German industrial leaders, on the Molotov-Ribbentrop model, by which the Russians would give German industry a guaranteed outlet to the east, especially in China. The Soviet Union, furthermore, could invade an unarmed neighbor at any time.

### Risks for the West

In carrying out such an invasion the Russians would be able to make use of forces located a scant hundred miles from Berlin; while the withdrawal of American troops across the Atlantic would greatly diminish our ability to strike back. Nevertheless, the certainty that a Soviet invasion of Germany would precipitate a global conflict with the United States might be expected to act as a strong deterrent.

Meanwhile, the assurance of a breathing space might cause a great, although unpredictable, change in the European atmosphere. Thus, some observers think that a German treaty would lead the French to strengthen their national defense and their political solidarity, while others believe that defeatism and neutralism would grow.

Much would, of course, depend on developments inside a unified Germany. If a strong, liberal regime emerged, Germany might act as a buffer state moderating tension between East and West. Should economic pressures, the refugee problem, the question of the lost territories and a resurgence of neo-Nazism clashing with communism lead to turmoil and internal conflict, however, Germany might intensify the rivalry between the great powers.

In view of the great risks that might be created by a treaty, the United States has insisted that any Four Power negotiations must consider other questions besides Germany, such as the completion of the Austrian pact and enforcement of peace treaty

restrictions on the arms of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. This might ease the present threat against Yugoslavia and lead to moderation of Balkan tensions, thus justifying sacrifices on Germany. The French, on the other hand, stress the need to reduce the immediate threat of war over Germany and are accordingly more ready to reach an agreement with Moscow limited to German problems.

Since great dangers are inherent in both German rearmament and a compromise peace treaty, are there any other alternatives? One proposal—by Walter Lippmann—is that agreement should be reached on the “principle of parity” of both occupation and German forces, thereby relieving Russian fears without sacrificing Western security. Since the Russians now enjoy all the propaganda advantages they might have if Germany were actually rearmed, while we derive no added security from a blueprint army, it might be wise to allay East European and Russian fears by suspending indefinitely our previously announced plans. If this led to an easing of the present atmosphere of fear and hysteria, agreement might be reached at some future time either to unify Germany or to revive the rearmament project. Meanwhile, an intensified effort to strengthen non-German defenses in Western Europe and to augment American reinforcements might reduce the risks of whatever policy was adopted in the future.

FRED W. RIGGS  
(The third article in a series on Western defense.)

### Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BOSTON, January 27, *Collective Genius at Work*, K. K. Paluev

SPRINGFIELD, January 27, *The American Problem in the Far East*, W. H. Chamberlain, Lafayette Marchand

NEW YORK, January 27, Student Forum, Emil Lengyel

PROVIDENCE, January 29, *Where and How Shall We Build Our Defenses?*, Richard C. Rowson

DETROIT, January 30, *United Action for Peace*, Joseph E. Johnson

HARTFORD, January 31, *Iran*, Henry Dawes

BUFFALO, February 1, *The Crisis in Asia*, John K. Fairbank

ALBANY, February 5, *Israel and the Arab States*, Jacob C. Hurewitz

LYNN, February 5, *Crisis in the Orient*, William Henry Chamberlin

DETROIT, February 6, *Guns and Butter—Arma-ment Program*, Harlow J. Heneman

ELMIRA, February 6, *India and American Foreign Policy*, M. S. Sundaram

ST. LOUIS, February 7, *The Role of ECA in the Present Crisis*, William C. Foster

## News in the Making

**BRITISH CABINET SHIFTS:** Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee reshuffled his cabinet on January 17, moving Aneurin Bevan, popular and controversial leader of the Labor party's left wing, to the Ministry of Labor and National Service. Bevan's task will be a difficult one, especially if Britain's rearmament efforts should call for reimposition of the direction of workers. The main question now is who will replace Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, whose ability to carry out his duties has been limited by a chronic heart condition.

**INDIA'S FOOD CRISIS:** One answer to the question as to why India persists in seeking a settlement of the Korean conflict is given by the food crisis, which threatens not only economic but also political difficulties in India. On January 20 New Delhi reduced food-grain rations by 25 per cent, to nine ounces a day—a decision which, according to on-the-spot observers, may foster political unrest favorable to communism. Meanwhile, Washington has yet taken no action on India's request for 2 million tons of grain.

**SPANISH ORES VITAL:** As the raw material scramble continues, the Western powers appear to be more concerned about Spain's mineral wealth than about its military strength. Wolfram ore, source of tungsten, has doubled in price within the last month, and American experts are currently in Spain seeking to negotiate purchase agreements for an increased output of this critical metal.

**REFORM LAGS IN PHILIPPINES:** The Philippine Congress adjourned its second special session on January 19 after adopting two minor tax measures. Actual legislative accomplishments fell so far short of meeting the government pledges of economic reform to ECA that the regular session of Congress, which begins January 21, will continue to wrestle with the problem. While the United States accepts responsibility for the defense of the islands, no economic aid will be granted until domestic reforms are underway.

DETROIT, February 8, *United Nations Challenge*, Lawrence Pruess

PHILADELPHIA, February 9, 10, Conference on Foreign Policy in Cooperation with the State Department, Dean Rusk, W. Averell Harriman